Gorbachev's foreign and domestic policies are brief: the table

Only the incorrigible idealists-romantics could dream of winning the world Marxist revolution in the second half of the eighties. With the naked eye, one could be convinced of the ineffectiveness of the command and administrative economy and the absurdity of its results. The whole world, including countries at much lower levels of development, was experiencing the problem of selling surplus goods, while the so-called "socialist camp" suffered from their shortage. The USSR, theoretically the richest state, in practice could not support its own population. At this critical moment, a man came to power, unlike previous party leaders. Gorbachev's foreign and domestic policy resulted in the destruction of almost everything that was created by three generations of Soviet people in a historically short time (in just six years). Is it the fault of the secretary general or just the circumstances?

What kind of person is Gorbachev

For the Soviet leader, he was young. The citizens of the USSR, who were accustomed to indistinct speeches of elderly leaders, at first listened with interest to the newly elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, marveling at the usual thing-the ability to speak in Russian and without paper. In 1985, MS Gorbachev turned 54 years old, according to party nomenclature standards - "Komsomolets". In the time that preceded the mastery of the highest leading post, Mikhail Sergeyevich had a lot: to finish school (1950), to work as a combine operator, to enter the law faculty of the Moscow State University, to marry (1953), to become a member of the CPSU and to take the post of secretary of the city committee in Stavropol (1955). It is the last point in the biography that raises questions: all the previous work was done by many Soviet people, but sitting down just two years after getting the diploma in such a high chair is already a Houdini-style trick. Well, okay, maybe a young man (22-year-old) really did grab the stars from the sky. Moreover, he was not the first secretary, and in order to continue his career, he had to graduate another high school - an agricultural one - and work in the Komsomol.

Selection of a new General Secretary

Mikhail Sergeyevich always "correctly understood" the party's foreign and domestic policies. Gorbachev noticed that in 1978 he was "taken" to Moscow, where his serious party career began. He becomes secretary of the Central Committee, so far, neither the first nor the general. Since 1982, the notorious "races on the carriage" began. Brezhnev was taken to the Mausoleum (to the necropolis near the Kremlin wall) , then Andropov, followed by Chernenko, and the question arose about who to put on the responsible post to break this funeral marathon. And they chose Gorbachev. He was the youngest challenger.

Early years

Clearly, the appointment happened for a reason. For power they always fight, even standing with one foot in the grave. A young and seemingly promising party member was noticed by prominent communist leaders, Gromyko himself supported him, and Ligachev and Ryzhkov saw him as the savior of the ideas of the founders.

At first, Mikhail Sergeevich did not disappoint his protege. He acted within the given framework, strengthened self-supporting relations, agitated for acceleration, in general, the first two years and the external and internal policies of Gorbachev remained within the permissible deviations from the constantly fluctuating line of the party. In 1987, there were some changes, at first glance, insignificant, in fact, threatening tectonic shifts. The party resolved some types of private enterprise, limiting it to a cooperative movement. In fact, this was the undermining of the socialist foundations, the revisionism of clean water, a kind of NEP, but the results achieved in the 1920s could not be repeated in the 80's. Such internal policy of Gorbachev did not lead to an improvement in the life of the main part of the population and did not improve economic indicators, but caused the ferment of minds, which led to the undermining of the ideological foundations of the existence of the Soviet society.

Instead of filling the market with cheap consumer goods and improving the service in the public catering there was some disgrace. Cooperative cafes were accessible only to the same "co-ops" and their economic opponents - the retraining (it's easier: extortionists). Goods no longer become, to adapt to the new conditions was possible relatively small stratum of people adventurous character store. But these were all just florets ...

And in the fight with a green serpent snake wins

The first really serious blow to the Soviet power was caused by Gorbachev, issuing an anti-alcohol decree. Stratification for the propertied and not so poor, store assortment, rising prices and much more the population could forgive the talkative secretary general. But he encroached on the way of life habitual for the broad masses, a natural way to escape from the gray Soviet reality. Such internal policy of Gorbachev turned away from him a significant part of the population. No doubt, it is necessary to combat drunkenness, but the methods turned out to be completely unacceptable, and there were no alternative ways of leisure. There were, of course, video shows (again, co-operative ones) in which Emmanuel was played for a moderate fee, "Tender May" sounded from the windows of private "recording studios", but it could not compensate for the absence of hot drinks in the store. But moonshakers and sellers of rectificate have managed.

The economic situation and its consequences

The West fought for a long time with communism, seeing it as a threat to its existence. Actually, in the 80's it was not an ideological confrontation - to hope that the theoretical research of the leaders of the USSR, published in huge numbers, could shake the foundations of a market economy, it was not necessary. Western countries feared threats of less exquisite - nuclear missiles, for example, or submarines. At the same time, their leaders did not act in a very logical way: they undermined the economic foundations of the Soviet Union, playing on lowering the price of oil and gas. This led to a budget deficit and, as a consequence, to an increased risk of accidents at nuclear facilities. The Chernobyl catastrophe happened, Afghanistan continued the war, exacerbating the already poor budget. Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies were briefly characterized at that time as pro-Western. The dissidents were released and honored in the Kremlin. Destroyed missiles of small and medium range, so disturbing Western Europe (the 1987 agreement). All this was done compulsorily, but was issued for the gestures of goodwill.

Separatism

The calculation for a friendly understanding of the West and his help was not justified. Even more pathetic was Gorbachev's domestic policy. Briefly describe it in one word: "helplessness." Separatist sentiments, fueled by foreign special services, reached a climax. A series of interethnic conflicts (Tbilisi, Baku, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Baltic States) have not met with a worthy rebuff - neither ideological, nor, in extreme cases, power. The society weakened in the fight against poverty was demoralized. Gorbachev's domestic policy could not rely on internal resources, but did not receive external material support. As luck would have it, there was an earthquake in Armenia. The Soviet Union, which had recently seemed unshakable, cracked at the seams. Nationalist movements were booming in Ukraine, Moldavia, the Central Asian republics and within the RSFSR. For all this bacchanalia, the leadership of the country looked at the helplessly, spreading hands and commenting on the bloodshed.

Restructuring

Gorbachev's internal policy was briefly defined by the very words "perestroika" and "democratization". Any foreman knows that it is impossible to change the load-bearing structures of a building if people live in it, but the secretary general thought otherwise. And the bricks fell on their heads ... Enterprises that worked for decades, suddenly turned out to be unprofitable. The state even managed to mine gold in the mines with losses. Above the country loomed the sinister specter of unemployment. The calls to "do everything in their place for their own cause in good faith" sounded too abstract. The discontent of the population grew and seized ever wider social masses-from convinced supporters of socialism, who were indignant at unprecedented ideological concessions, to adherents of liberal values that complained about the insufficiency of freedoms. By the end of the eighties, a systemic crisis was ripe, in which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev himself was largely guilty. The domestic policy pursued by him proved to be ineffective and contradictory.

Foreign policy successes

In 1989 there was a unification of power in one person. The General Secretary is also head of the Supreme Soviet, trying to somehow take control of the activities of people's deputies who are too "ruffled". The success was not crowned with success, the strong-willed qualities of the leader, who became the President of the USSR (actually self-proclaimed) for the next year, clearly did not suffice.

The internal and foreign policies of Gorbachev were illogical and contradictory. Briefly, it can be designated as the preservation of claims for superpower without the means of actual confirmation of this status.

Soviet troops are leaving Afghanistan, but the backbone of the economy is already broken, and this situation does not save. Nevertheless, Mikhail Sergeyevich has a lot of foreign friends - presidents, prime ministers and royalty. They find the Soviet president a pleasant interlocutor, a nice person, at least, they so characterize him during the interview. This is Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policy, which can be briefly defined as the desire to be pleasant in all respects.

Assignments to the West

The authority of the USSR in the world is rapidly declining, with the opinion of the Soviet leader, not only the US, but also small countries bordering on the Union and most recently regarded as a great neighbor, at least with caution, cease to be considered.

The notorious expansion of NATO to the East began in the late Gorbachev years. Weakening of the Union's positions on the international arena turned away from it former satellites around the world, and above all Eastern European ones. The lack of resources forced the Soviet leadership first to cut back, and then completely stop assistance to the regimes conducting an anti-imperialist (or anti-American) policy. There was even a new term: "new thinking", with an emphasis on the first syllable, as if it were a mouse. At least, that's what Gorbachev himself said. Domestic and foreign policy (the table of events preceding the collapse of the world socialist system is presented below) is cracking at all seams ...

This was (as Gorbachev understood it) domestic and foreign policy. The table of achievements in the field of state reforms looks no less depressing:

In the history of the USSR there are few examples that led to such devastating consequences as Gorbachev's domestic policy. The table clearly demonstrates that the result was unsuccessful in all three main areas of reform.

The final

The attempted coup d'etat, called the putsch, undertaken in August 1991, demonstrated the utter powerlessness of the supreme power over the terrible realities of the end of the millennium. Gorbachev's internal policy, weak and inconsistent, soon led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union into fifteen fragments, suffering in their majority with "phantom pains" of the post-communist period. The consequences of concessions in the international arena are still felt today.