Tallinn Transition of the Baltic Fleet

The event that occurred in the last days of July 1941 entered the history of the Great Patriotic War and was called the Tallinn Transition of the Baltic Fleet. This unprecedented in its complexity operation was one of the examples of courage and dedication of Soviet sailors.

Counting the Command

As evidenced by the archival documents of the past years, the beginning of the fascist Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, the main base of the Baltic Fleet was in Tallinn. However, despite this, the necessary work to strengthen the city from land and sea were not conducted. The hopes of the command were placed on the fact that, in view of its removal from the state border, the capital of Estonia would not be attacked by the enemy.

These calculations were crossed out by the rapid development of offensive operations by the German army, as a result of which, in the first decade of July 1941, the enemy was sixty kilometers from Tallinn, thus creating a real threat to the naval base stationed in it, land units, Evacuate the civilian population.

Despite the fact that the need for evacuation was quite obvious, the command of the North-Western direction, headed by Marshal Voroshilov, fearing responsibility, did not dare to issue an appropriate order, and thus time was lost. For this reason, the withdrawal of the ships of the Baltic Fleet and the ground forces from the enemy blockade, in which they found themselves, began under the heavy fire of the enemy. This operation was included in the history of the war called the Tallinn transition.

The efforts of the enemy aimed at capturing Tallinn

Such a rapid offensive of German troops was caused by Hitler's order, demanding at any cost to prevent the transfer of ground forces and ships of the Baltic Fleet to Leningrad, which, according to the Barbarossa plan, was taken as one of the priorities of the German command.

As a result, the Tallinn transition was carried out under the fire of seventeen artillery divisions deployed on the southern shore of the Gulf of Finland, supported by two Finnish batteries. In addition, the situation was catastrophically complicated by a significant number of minefields exposed by joint efforts of the German and Finnish fleets, as well as the enemy's naval aircraft. A serious danger was posed by Finnish torpedo boats operating in the water area of the bay.

The order that caused confusion

Today, military experts are often called upon by the command plan, on the basis of which the Tallinn transition was carried out. Bunich Igor Lvovich - a famous Russian writer, historian and publicist, - in his book on the events of those years, draws attention to the unintelligible decision to use only the central channel for the passage of all the ships.

There is no doubt that only it was deep enough and suitable for the Kirov who took part in the crossing, but why it was forbidden to use other fairways for the other ships, which had much less draft, is unclear. Thus, the fleet stretched for many kilometers, and to ensure its protection against the sea and air forces of the enemy was almost impossible.

As evidenced in his book by Igor Bunich, the Tallinn transition was carried out with a catastrophic shortage of minesweepers. For this reason, the mine investigation was not properly carried out, and the water area of the bay was fraught with mortal danger due to the huge number of both German and Soviet sea mines.

The disposition, outlined by the command of the fleet

According to the plan developed by the headquarters of the operation, the Tallinn transition was to be carried out in the following way: in front was a detachment of main forces, followed by cover ships, rear guard, and four convoys closed the caravan. Before each group of ships a certain task was posed, the successful outcome of which depended on the overall outcome of the case.

In total, two hundred and twenty-five ships took part in the operation. The detachment of the main forces was headed by the cruiser Kirov. It was followed by four destroyers, five submarines, the same number of minesweepers and a large number of torpedo, guard and other boats. It was a detachment of main forces.

The detachment consisted of three destroyers, four submarines and boats for various purposes. The rear guard consisted of three destroyers, three patrol ships and boats. In their care there were four convoys, consisting of a large number of transport ships carrying various cargoes and people. In addition to the listed ships, a large number of additional security ships took part in the operation.

Exit to the sea and the first losses

The Tallinn transition began in the early morning of August 28, when warships and transports were ordered to enter an external raid. However, their rapid advance was prevented by the storm that was raging this day, accompanied by a strong northeasterly wind. Only towards evening the weather conditions improved, and the ships, despite the enemy's heavy artillery fire, began to be rebuilt into marching order.

Literally from the first minutes in the fight against sea mines , minesweepers entered, constantly cutting them with their paravanes - specially designed for this purpose devices, as well as trawls. But the bay was so peppered with mines that the ships did not always manage to evade the meeting with them in time. As a result, nine surface ships and two submarines became victims of minefields that day.

Evening and night filled with nightmare

On the first day of the journey, the transports and the convoy were repeatedly subjected to artillery shelling of the enemy, which was sweeping intensely, but to no avail. At about 8 pm, Finnish torpedo boats were seen approaching the Soviet ships, but with a dense fire of guns, they were driven away before they reached the distance of the torpedo shot. The caravan suffered heavy losses as a result of an attack by enemy aviation, undertaken before the onset of darkness. Four Soviet ships were sunk, and two more received serious damage.

But in an even greater degree the situation became more complicated with the onset of darkness, when, the main detachment of ships was in the middle of a continuous minefield. That night, 11 surface ships and one submarine were blown up on mines and sunk. Of their many crews and passengers on board, only a few dozen people were saved.

Based on the current situation, the fleet commander was forced to order all remaining vessels to anchor and wait for dawn. The result of this first night of the campaign was terrible - twenty-six ships of those that had left Tallinn from before the day were sunk. In addition, five ships - damaged, two captured by the enemy, and one missing.

Air attacks of the enemy

With the first rays of the sun on August 29, 1941, the ships continued their journey, but on this day fate prepared even greater trials for them. Already at 5.30 am the German reconnaissance planes appeared over the caravan, and from 7.30 the airplanes followed one after another. Their frequency was facilitated by the proximity of coastal aerodromes, the distance to which did not exceed one hundred kilometers, and the almost complete absence of Soviet aircraft in the sky.

Almost without encountering any serious fire resistance, German pilots had the opportunity to choose the largest and most vulnerable targets, and then coolly hit them. As a result of the aiming bombing on August 29, another fourteen were added to the previously lost ships, and the number of those that were damaged and demanded towage increased.

Rescue work that saved thousands of lives

This day was marked by the greatest number of casualties among both sailors and among ship passengers, including evacuated land forces and civilians. Nevertheless, more than nine thousand three hundred people were saved as a result of actions to help those in distress, and about six thousand were able to land from burning ships on the island of Hogland. Crews of ships sent specifically for rescue operations from Kronstadt, as well as the islands of Lavensaari and Gogland, managed to save thousands of lives.

An attempt to understand the causes of the tragedy

Explaining the reasons for the large number of losses that accompanied the Tallinn transition, Bunich Igor Lvovich, whose book was discussed above, as well as a number of military historians, point to the extreme incompetence of the command, sometimes giving orders that contradict common sense. For example, the already small cover was weakened by an order received from the cruiser Kirov, according to which two submarines were ordered, leaving the convoy, at full speed to go to Kronstadt, which they did immediately.

Aware that a number of orders were dictated by the apparent incompetence of officials, the commanders of individual ships, contrary to the order, conducted their vessels by the southern channel and, having safely reached the destination, rescued people.

Vessels achieving the desired goal

By the evening of that hard day, the first ships of the main forces of the caravan began arriving in Kronstadt. Until midnight, twenty-nine of them managed to safely anchor at the raid of this largest naval base. In addition, another sixteen reached the location of our troops on the island of Hogland.

August 30 in Kronstadt arrived singly, or in small groups another one hundred and seven ships. Immediately the delivery of all the rescued crew members, as well as soldiers and civilians to Leningrad was organized. The wounded were distributed to hospitals, and those who could hold weapons were recorded in units that were being formed to be sent to the front. Thus, the Tallinn transition was completed, the results of which allow it to be attributed to the most tragic pages of the history of the Soviet Navy.

The losses incurred during the transition days

In spite of the fact that in separate printed publications the various number of the vessels which have died during this operation is resulted, it is considered to be that they were sixty-two. This number is most consistent with the data available to researchers. It included both warships, and auxiliary, as well as transport ships.

There is also no consensus on the number of deaths. Admiral Tributs, who commanded in those years the Baltic Fleet, in his memoirs speaks of five thousand dead. From a report to Stalin, the People's Commissar of the Navy, N. G. Kuznetsov, it follows that there were seven thousand seven hundred people, and the official publication of the General Staff reports ten thousand. Obviously, this information is most consistent with reality, since in Soviet times it was not customary to overstate one's own losses.

Anniversary of the tragic events

This year marks the 75th anniversary of the Tallinn transition, in connection with which the public's attention was drawn to this heroic page of Russian history. At the end of August, a number of historical and patriotic events took place, in which both veterans of the fleet and young people took part.

Documentary films dedicated to this tragic event were released on the screens of the country. The Tallinn transition is presented in them on the basis of archival documents and memoirs of participants of events. They tell about the task that was set before the Baltic sailors. In addition to the work of Igor Bunich, mentioned above, in those days other books about the Tallinn transition were presented to the readers' attention.