Monetary reform of 1961 in the USSR: positive and negative sides

In 1960, the government of the Soviet Union adopted a resolution on monetary reform. Until now, all documents relating to its conduct are classified. It is possible to talk about the reasons that led to it, and in most cases they, today called researchers, did take place, but it does not give us the full picture. What is the monetary reform of 1961 in the USSR? The search for enemies, economic voluntarism NS. Khrushchev or necessity? It will not be possible to answer this immediately.

The essence of monetary reform

Before the monetary reform of 1961, the currency circulated in the USSR in circulation in 1947 was circulation. The reform began on January 1, 1961, lasted 1 quarter, was a kind of denomination and devaluation. Although the government tried in every possible way to emphasize that it was a simple exchange of money (denomination).

To exchange all bank notes were accepted without restriction. Old paper bills changed to new ones, which had a smaller format and a ratio of 10: 1.

In addition, in accordance with the resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of May 4, 1960, No. 470, wholesale, retail, purchasing and settlement prices for all types of goods, works, services, as well as mark-ups, margins, discounts, which were fixed in hard Amounts. And also all types of deposits held in savings banks, cash desks, banks, all types of wages, including tariff rates, salaries, fees, fees, bonuses, any kind of cash allowances and so on.

Denomination

As stated in the official version of the reform, presented by the Ministry of Finance of the USSR, the implementation of the monetary reform was caused by the easing of circulation of money and giving them greater usefulness. The true reasons for holding this event remained undeclared, which allowed specialists to make their own conclusions, and for most people the exchange of money remained in memory just a simple denomination.

Devaluation

Since at that time the circulation of foreign currency was banned in the country, the overwhelming majority of the population had no idea of the exchange rate, and the majority of the population of the country judged the price of gold for the price of jewelry, the changes in the ruble-dollar exchange rate and its gold security.

In other words, as financiers say, there was a devaluation of the ruble of the Soviet era, as a result of which its gold content was sharply reduced and the exchange rate to the dollar was changed. If before 1961 for one dollar 4 rubles were given, then after the reform, its value did not change, like everything else, 10 times, but only 4.44 times. Now the dollar was worth 0.90 cents. The gold price went up by the same amount. If before the reform, one ruble contained 0.222 g, after the reform, this indicator became 0.987 g.

Reasons for devaluation

The monetary reform of 1961 in the USSR was devoted to a lot of research. They are extremely contradictory. In particular, one of the reasons for the reform is called the increase in oil production and export by the Soviet Union. As far as this reason is justified, it is difficult to say, but in fact, oil production increased year by year.

A number of other reasons are also mentioned: economic difficulties connected with reforms in management and agriculture; The arms race is also a real factor that could have a negative impact on the economy of the USSR, which is confirmed by the reduction of the army; Gratuitous assistance to "friendly" countries.

How did the reform

After the publication of resolution No. 470 in print, purchases of manufactured goods increased manyfold, sales in jewelry and fur stores increased, and deposits of the population in savings banks increased, since they were automatically subject to exchange and recalculation.

In October 1960, bank deposits began to be recalculated. On the price tags in the shops there were two prices: new and old. This was done with the aim of enabling the population to get used to new prices. Since January 1, 1961, the exchange of old monetary bills and coins for new ones has begun. There were created special exchangers where you could exchange any amount of old money.

New sample money

By the size of the banknote of the monetary reform of 1961 were very different from those that were in use. They were several times smaller than old bills. In addition, they were colored - red, green, lilac. In principle, the form of money is more convenient for calculations.

Denominations issued in nominal value 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 25, 50, 100 rubles. Steel coins and new coins worth 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 15 cents and 1 ruble. All old-style coins were withdrawn from circulation. The exception was copper money 1, 2, 3 kopecks. Beginning in 1958, their coinage ceased and new coins began to be produced in large quantities. For example, a coin of 15 kopecks was released in huge quantities and the coinage continued using a single stamp for 30 years, which made their release truly gigantic.

"Old" and "new" money differed in appearance, since the latter were smaller and more convenient to handle. In this regard, the people came up with a new name for banknotes after the 1961 reform - candy wrappers. Reducing the cost of paper when printing bills - this is one of the positive factors. The design of money, in principle, is preserved. The only thing, instead of a portrait of Lenin on banknotes appeared his profile.

The Consequences of the Reform

To the positive sides of the reform can be attributed a reduction in spending on the production of money and the normalization of prices for basic food (bread, salt, sugar, milk) and matches.

The negative consequences include, first of all, a decrease in the purchasing power of the population, an increase in the prices of food and goods. For products with a low initial cost, the price increase was 10%. For example, if the cost of 1 kg of tomato on the market was 15 cents before the reform, even after the reform they cost "new" 15 cents.

The state gold security of the ruble, as mentioned above, was reduced, which led to its depreciation. The exchange rate of the ruble to the dollar has changed. If earlier Soviet money was independent of him, then after the reform it changed, which entailed a high cost of imports.

The effect of the reforms carried out was and lasted more than 30 years, but, according to a number of researchers, the negative consequences affected after these years and led, along with Gorbachev's perestroika, to the collapse of the USSR. To hold out without obvious consequences, except for the deterioration in the life of the population, this period of time was possible due to the lack of a labor market and all the factors that accompany it: cheap labor resources, high export profitability. It is these factors that allowed the state to develop quite successfully economically.

What was the reason for such a hasty implementation of the monetary reform?

Prerequisites

In short, the monetary reform of 1961 was not carried out on its own. It was, according to some scholars, in the complex of reforms planned and conducted by NS Khrushchev. There is another opinion that the monetary reform was caused by these reforms, since most of them can be considered unsuccessful and led the country to economic instability.

Like most of NS Khrushchev's transformations, the monetary reform of 1961 in the USSR was of an ill-timed, sudden character, which did not take into account the consequences to which they could lead. Most of them were scheduled even under Stalin, with calculations being carried out and consequences predicted. But for a number of reasons, it was not possible to implement them.

This was taken advantage of by NS Khrushchev, making a decision to eliminate all problems in one fell swoop, which subsequently adversely affected the country's economy and was called economic voluntarism.

Reform of management

One of the reasons for the exchange of money is the failure of the management reform initiated in 1957 by NS Khrushchev. In the course of its conduct, the entire territory of the USSR was divided into administrative regions. In them for management were created Sovnarkhoz. They, instead of ministries, on the ground performed the management of the national economy.

Most of the union and republican ministries dealing with industry and construction were abolished. The subordinated enterprises were transferred to local Sovnarkhoz. The aim of the reform was to bring the leadership of industry or construction closer to the lower levels and to reduce the administrative and managerial staff.

Sovnarkhozy are collegial bodies, which initially consisted of several people, but in time, new sections and departments began to be created to solve the necessary questions. If in the first years the reduction of the administrative apparatus was significant and brought the desired result, then over time its expansion exceeded all expectations.

Reform of agriculture

Khrushchev's experiments were subjected to agriculture. By the end of the 50s of the 20th century, industrial production far advanced in comparison with agriculture. The consolidation of the inhabitants of villages and villages to a certain place of residence, caused by the need to avoid hunger, was started in the 1930s and remained after the Patriotic War until the restoration of the central part of the country that had been under occupation. Cities, villages, settlements were turned into ruins. Factories, factories were destroyed or evacuated deep into the country. The implementation of reforms at this time would lead to unpredictable consequences, so this issue was postponed for a while.

The Stalin government succeeded in rebuilding factories, setting up life in the countryside, but no money was used to pay for the collective farmers' labor. In most cities people began to live better. More to earn and, of course, to spend. This inequality between rural and urban residents, of course, caused a lot of justified criticism.

During the reform, these issues, of course, needed to be addressed. But along with them, mistaken decisions were made, to put it mildly. In particular, this concerns the closure of the MTS, which led to a reduction in the machine and tractor fleet, machine-tool specialists. This step inflicted irreparable harm on agriculture, forcing the state to buy grain abroad. Unreasonable plans for meat procurement led to a significant reduction in the number of cattle.

The need for reform was urgently needed, but the government of NS Khrushchev made mistakes.

Reduction of the army

It was under Khrushchev that the army was reduced, which was reduced by 1.3 million people and, according to a number of researchers, that the Soviet armed forces inflicted considerable damage. The fact is that the reduction of the army was prepared under Stalin. It should have been systematic. Everything was thoroughly calculated, the time of the reform was to be 3 years, in addition, the vital needs of all those who were discharged to the reserve (housing, pensions) were taken into account.

Carrying out the reform of the army Khrushchev had some unpredictable and pejorative attitude towards the front-line soldiers, people who gave the army the best years of life, went through the war from the first to the last minute. Without a military pension, they left not only those who needed to wait for 1-2 years, but also 1-2 months.

Such a reduction, of course, saved the state money in the form of unpaid pensions, reducing the cost of keeping more than a million people. But the army was dealt a powerful blow. Thrown out were millions of soldiers and their families who were left without work, shelter and livelihood.

Conclusion

The issue of Khrushchev's reforms, including monetary reform, was and still is quite interesting and little studied. Unequivocally answer it will not succeed. It is not entirely appropriate to observe the enemy influence of the West, although it probably did not happen without it.

The development of space, the economic breakthrough of the USSR is the result of a long-term military (the safety and transfer of most enterprises deep into the country) and the post-war far-sighted economic policies of the state and the entire people as a whole, and not Khrushchev's "great" reformer. But also to deny its positive merit is also not worth it.